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1.  Introduction 
 
 
The current world economic crisis originated in the financial sector of the advanced 
economies, beginning with the sup-prime mortgage problem and the meltdown of mortgage 
backed securities in the US.  The financial crisis had its immediate reverberations in those 
developing countries that were closely linked to the global financial markets, as capital took 
refuge in safe havens and there was a rapid flight of capital from emerging markets to the 
advanced economies and particularly the US.  This initial impact on the LDCs, however, was 
less pronounced as they were less integrated into the global financial markets.  With the 
deepening of the financial crisis, freezing of credit, and the sharp fall in the market value of 
private wealth, the financial crisis turned into a crisis of the real economy beginning in the fall 
of 2008.  The LDCs have been affected more during this later phase of real economic crisis. 
The global economic crisis has led to a sharp reduction in world trade and rapid decline in 
commodity prices.  This is one of the main mechanisms through which LDCs have been 
affected. Foreign direct investment (FDI) flows which achieved their highest level in 2007 
have been declining rapidly since the onset of the financial crisis. The decline in FDI is the 
second channel through which the LDC economies have been affected.   A third transmission 
mechanism, which can be of critical importance for some LDCs, is the slowdown in migrant 
workers remittance flows.  As unemployment in the advanced countries increases and the end 
of commodity export boom in some of the labour importing developing countries reduces the 
demand for migrant labour, the labour exporting LDCs may experience noticeable declines in 
remittance flows.  The economic crisis has led to a sharp deterioration in the fiscal position of 
all advanced economies which is expected to continue past 2010.  This can put pressure on 
ODA budget of the OECD countries, which can potentially have dire consequences for the 
LDCs. 
The impact of the global economic crisis on the LDCs is thus multifaceted, and it will affect 
different countries in different ways, depending on the mode of integration of the particular 
LDC in the global economy and the structure of its domestic economy.  There is also still a 
great deal of uncertainty with regard to the depth and length of the economic recession in the 
advanced countries, as expectations with regard to the real economy continue to be revised 
downward (see, e.g., OECD, 2009).  It is nevertheless clear that the global crisis is likely to 
have important implications for growth and poverty reduction in the LDCs and for the 
achievement of the Millennium Development Goals.  This can be particularly onerous, as the 
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current global crisis has arrived on the heels of the food and fuel crisis of 1977-78 which 
inflicted a great deal of hardship on non-oil exporting LDCs. 
This paper examines the implications of the global crisis for growth and poverty in the LDCs.  
The next section discusses the impact of the crisis on the LDCs through trade, workers 
remittances and FDI and Official Development Assistance (ODA).  Section 3 assesses the 
implications of the financial crisis for growth and poverty reduction in the LDCs. Projections 
of the likely effects of the crisis on poverty levels are provided. The financing needs of LDCs 
and policies to mitigate the impact of the crisis are discussed in Section 4. Section 5 
concludes the paper by discussing the main findings and their policy implications. Policy 
recommendations are also provided, highlighting measures and national and international 
levels. 
2.  Impact of the Crisis on Least Developed Countries 
2.1 Trade in Goods and Services  
On the surface the current conditions facing the LDCs may appear similar to those following 
the end of the commodity price boom of the 1970s.  The collapse of the commodity boom of 
the 1970s led to a prolonged period of adjustment and stagnation in the LDCs which lasted up 
to the latter half of the 1990s.  This may create the impression that the collapse of the 
commodity price boom in the wake of the current global financial and economic crisis may 
lead to a similarly prolonged and shallow recession in the LDCs.  This is not, however, 
entirely accurate, due to the nature of the current global economic crisis and more importantly 
because of the important structural changes which the LDC economies have undergone during 
the past two decades.  Of course the severity and length of the economic downturn in the 
LDCs depends on the severity and length of the current global economic crisis which remains 
uncertain.  More importantly, however, the current structures of the LDC economies and their 
mode of integration into the global economy is very different from those prevailing during the 
late 1970s. 
The prolonged period of economic adjustment in the aftermath of commodity price shocks of 
the 1970s was a result of an initial attempt by the LDCs to preserve income and employment 
in old industries which were set up during the earlier phase of development by making resort 
to increased borrowing.   Well before the onset of the current crisis, however, the LDC 
economies had gone far in trade liberalization and were more fully integrated into the global 
 3 
economy.
1
 LDCs account for less than 1 per cent of world trade, international trade plays a 
major role in LDC development, accounting for about 50 per cent of the GDP of the LDCs as 
a group.  This is also reflected in the rapid increase in export / GDP ratio in Asian and African 
LDCs since 1980 shown in Figure 1.  Island LDCs by their very nature have always had a 
high degree of trade openness, characterized by average trade / GDP ratios of close to 
hundred per cent.   
 The dismantling of the old protective 
industrial policies, more liberalized trade 
regimes, and the much higher ratios of 
foreign trade to national incomes in the 
LDCs, imply that the impact of trade 
shocks are much sharper and more 
immediate than in the earlier periods, with 
relatively shorter duration, depending on 
the length of the global recession and 
providing there is no sharp policy reversals by the LDCs under economic stress.  The 
importance of external shocks emanating from the international economy for the LDCs is also 
signified in the close association between growth of real exports and GDP growth, shown for 
average African LDC countries in Figure 2.
2
  As can be seen, during the long commodity 
boom before the current global crisis, African LDCs managed to maintain relatively high rates 
of growth, well above those achieved during the 1980s and the 1990s.  With the collapse of 
world trade in the wake of the world 
economic crisis, these economies are likely 
to be affected more severely than other 
countries.   
 The way the LDCs are affected by the 
collapse of World trade critically depends 
on the nature of their trade specialization.  
Broadly speaking, African LDCs are 
primary commodity exporters, with more 
than 90 per cent of their merchandize 
                                                          
1
  See, LDC Report 2004 for a detailed analysis trade liberalization in LDCs. 
2
 Consistent time series data for Asian and Island LDCs on real exports are not available, except for the case of 
Bangladesh. 
Source: Based on WDI, World Bank
Figure 1, Average Export / GDP ratios in Afircan and Asian LDCs, 1980 
and 2007
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exports in African LDCs, 1980-2007
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exports as a group consisting of primary commodities.  Manufacturing exports specialization 
is by and large confined to a few Asian LDCs such as Bangladesh, Bhutan and Cambodia, 
where over 70 per cent of exports is composed of labour intensive manufacturing products in 
textiles, clothing and footwear.  A finer classification of the LDCs on the basis of their export 
specialization, conducted by UNCTAD, is shown in Table 1. 
Table 1,  Classification of LDCs according to their export specialization
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F)
Manufacturing Oil Mineral Agricultural Service Diversified
Exporters Exporters Exporters Exporters Exporters Exporters
Bangladesh Angola Burundi Afghanistan Comoros Lao PDR
Bhutan Chad Central African Rep. Benin Djibouti Madagascar
Cambodia Equatorial Guinea Congo, Dem. Rep. Burkina Faso Eritrea Myanmar
Haiti Sudan Guinea Guinea-Bissau Ethiopia Senegal
Lesotho Timor-Leste Mali Kiribati Gambia, The Togo
Nepal Yemen Mauritania Liberia Maldives
Mozambique Malawi Rwanda
Niger Solomon Islands Samoa
Sierra Leone Somalia Sao Tome & Principe
Zambia Tuvalu Tanzania
Uganda Vanuatu
Source:  Least Developed Countries Report, 2008, p.xiii, UNCTAD, Geneva.  Based on 2003-05 trade data.  
Manufacturing exporting LDCs such as Bangladesh, Bhutan, Cambodia, and Haiti (Group A, 
Table 1), are adversely affected by the global slump, as demand for their exports falls, output 
in export industries contracts and unemployment rises.  Without appropriate policy responses, 
this will lead to further rounds of contraction in the rest of the economy and intensifies 
poverty.  The fall in food and fuel imports prices can create some policy space in dealing with 
the slump in the export sector.  LDC countries in Group E, the services exporters, are 
similarly affected, as their main source of export revenues are tourism services which are 
highly income elastic, or transport services which are closely associated with merchandise 
trade.  The falling cost of aviation due to the fall in oil prices can to some extent reduce the 
impact for these countries. 
 The global slump in the case of primary commodity exporters works mainly through the 
collapse of the prices of commodity exports.  The reason is that in the case of primary 
commodities the main equilibrating mechanism in the market in the short run is price rather 
than quantity adjustment.  LDC countries in groups B and C in Table 1, namely the oil and 
mineral exporters, have seen dramatic declines in their export prices since the onset of the 
global recession.  As shown in Figures 3 and 4, crude oil and basic commodity metals 
witnessed a long period of sustained price increases between 2002 and 2008.  Since the onset 
of the global crisis, however, these price increases have been reversed in a very short period 
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of time.  Within a period of six months, between July 2008 and March 2009, crude oil and 
commodity metal price indexes have fallen by 70% and 59% respectively.  Such extreme 
price shocks, if they persist beyond the current 
period, will have devastating effects on the 
development prospects of this group of LDCs.  In 
the short run, however, the extent to which each 
country can deal with such shocks depends on 
the manner in which the revenues during the long 
commodity boom preceding the crisis has been 
utilized. 
The way the primary commodity collapse affects 
the domestic economy in these two country 
groups is different from the case of 
manufacturing and services exporters, as the 
main transmission mechanism in oil and mineral 
export activities is through the government 
budget.  This is more the case for oil exporters 
where the oil sector employs relatively few workers and has little linkages with the rest of the 
economy and at the same time generates big sums in the form of taxes and royalties for the 
government.  In fact in the case of some mineral exporting countries in sub-Saharan Africa 
such generous tax concessions have been given to mining companies that even at the peak of 
commodity prices in 2007 relatively small tax revenues from the export sector accrued to the 
government.  In such cases, e.g., copper in Zambia, export revenue growth during the boom is 
normally associated with profit repatriation on a similar scale, and the impact of the export 
sector on the domestic economy is more linked to the foreign direct investment conducted by 
the mining companies.  Similarly, the impact of the global recession in such mineral exporting 
countries can be more due to the withdrawal of FDI by the mining companies than the direct 
effect of the commodity price collapse on government revenue. 
The impact of the global recession on Group D countries, namely, the agricultural commodity 
exporting LDCs, is more immediate as fluctuations in these activities directly effects the 
livelihood of numerous farmers and traders working in these activities.  Price trajectories of 
agricultural commodity exports from this group of LDCs has been however rather different 
from oil and mineral exporters.  Figures 5 to 8 show price movements between March 1984 
Source, IMF
Figure 3, Commodity Metals Price Index
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Figure 4, Crude Oil Price Index
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
3
0
7
4
2
3
1
2
9
1
3
1
8
3
7
3
2
3
8
7
3
2
9
3
3
3
3
4
8
2
3
4
0
2
9
3
4
5
7
8
3
5
1
2
5
3
5
6
7
4
3
6
2
2
0
3
6
7
7
0
3
7
3
1
6
3
7
8
6
5
3
8
4
1
2
3
8
9
6
1
3
9
5
0
8
 6 
and March 2009 for some of the major 
agricultural commodity exports from 
the LDCs.  A number of features stand 
out.  First is the very high price 
volatility, along with the fact that the 
recent volatility since the onset of the 
world financial crisis has not so far 
been more outstanding than other 
frequent price shocks during the past 
three decades.  Secondly, though some 
of specific agricultural commodity 
exports such as coffee showed 
spectacular price booms during the 
2002-08 period, many other 
agricultural raw materials showed 
much more moderate price hikes 
during that period, and at the end of the 
period items such as fish, cotton, and 
agricultural raw materials in general 
stood below their historical peak in real 
terms.    
 As shown in Figure 9, oil and food 
commodity price hikes have 
overshadowed agricultural raw material 
prices since 2002.  As all the LDCs in 
this group are net oil importers, and 
some net food importers as well, the 
commodity price boom since early 
2000s has been costly to these 
economies, with considerable impact 
on balance of payments, mounting 
inflationary pressures, and fiscal 
constraints, particularly intensified 
during the 2007-08 food and fuel price boom.  To the extent that the fall in fuel and food 
Source, IMF databank
Figure 5 Commodity Cotton Price Index
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Figure 6,  Commodity Beverages Price Index
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Figure 7, Shrimp Price Index
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Figure 8, Agricultural raw materials price index 
0
30
60
90
120
150
M
a
r-
8
4
D
e
c
-8
5
S
e
p
-8
7
J
u
n
-8
9
M
a
r-
9
1
D
e
c
-9
2
S
e
p
-9
4
J
u
n
-9
6
M
a
r-
9
8
D
e
c
-9
9
S
e
p
-0
1
J
u
n
-0
3
M
a
r-
0
5
D
e
c
-0
6
S
e
p
-0
8
 7 
prices since the onset of the world financial and economic crisis has helped reduce such 
pressures, the negative impact of the crisis is somewhat reduced.  This is the case in the 
majority of LDCs with the exception of the oil exporting group and some mineral exporting 
countries.   
 The combined share of food and oil 
import bill as a percentage of total 
merchandise imports in the LDC 
countries is very high compared to 
international standards.  This is due to 
the fact that the LDCs finance a large 
part of their import bill by foreign aid, 
and hence one or two major items such 
as oil and food imports constitute a very 
large share of exports, as the total value 
of exports is in general much smaller 
than the import bill.  As shown in 
Figure 10, in the majority of the LDCs 
for which data is available, the share of 
food and fuel imports is over fifty per 
cent of total exports.  In the case of 
twelve countries the combined share of 
these two items is over 100 per cent.   
Considering that these figures do not 
include fuel costs implicit in the cost of 
services imports in the form of 
international transport, it becomes clear 
that, with the exception of a few oil 
exporting LDCs, the commodity boom 
of 2002-08 exerted foreign exchange 
pressure on the rest of the LDC 
economies, even those specializing in 
primary commodity exports.  This does 
not mean that the boom years did not 
Source:  IMF databank
Source: World Bank, WDI
Figure 9, Monthly price index: Oil, Food and Agricultural 
Raw Materials, 1984-2009 
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Figure 10,  Food and fuel imports as % of merchandize 
exports, 2002
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contribute to the growth of the LDC economies.  They benefited from fast growth of demand 
for their export sectors, improved prices and profitability of the export sectors relative to 
domestic oriented sectors, and growing foreign direct investment in these leading sectors.  As 
noted above, the commodity price boom period was associated with accelerated growth in the 
LDCs, but the food and fuel price hikes are likely to have moderated the impact on rising 
standards of living and poverty reduction. 
The decline in fuel and food prices since the onset of the global crisis has to some extent 
alleviated the impact of the crisis on the LDC economies, with the exception of oil and 
mineral exporting LDCs.  Figure 11 shows the balance of payment impact of the global crisis 
in LDCs according to their export specialization as a percentage of their GDP.  This is based 
on IMF (2009) simulations assuming 
a ten per cent shock on export 
volumes in the case of manufacturing 
and service exporters, and commodity 
prices reverting back to their 1995-
2007 averages.  As can be seen, on 
average non-oil and mineral exporting 
countries partially benefit under these 
assumptions.  It is important to note 
that this is the direct balance of 
payment impact, and it should not retract from the serious negative income shock that the 
global crisis inflicts on producers in the export sectors of the manufacturing, services, and 
agricultural exporting countries. 
To the extent that oil and mineral exporting LDCs have acted prudently by building up 
foreign exchange reserves and stabilization funds during the boom years, they will be in a 
better position than the rest of the LDCs to cope with the impact of the recession, at least in 
the short run.  On the other hand, other LDCs can find it more difficult to deal with the global 
crisis arriving on the wake of the food and fuel price increases of 2007 and 2008 which has 
led to a diminution of their foreign exchange and fiscal resources.   The impact, in any event, 
is likely to be severe in all the LDCs, particularly if the global recession is prolonged into 
2010 and 2011.  The global recession has led to drastic fall in export volumes and prices with 
important implications for balance of payments, government budgets, investment and 
economic activity in the export sectors and beyond.  With the fall in price and profitability of 
Source:  Based on IMF, 2009.
Figure 11,  Balance of payments shock for average LDC 
in different export specialization groupings, 2009
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investment in primary producing sectors, this has had important implications on FDI flows to 
the LDCs as well. 
2.2 FDI and other private capital flows 
In a large number of LDC countries foreign banks dominate the banking system in terms of 
the ownership of banking assets.  In sixteen LDCs for which data are available more than 50 
per cent of total banking assets are foreign owned.
3
  In ten African LDCs, foreign ownership 
constitutes more than two thirds of the banking assets.
4
  The direct fallout of the global 
financial crisis on the LDCs as compared to other developing countries, however, has been 
relatively limited.  The foreign banks in the LDCs have been mainly engaged in provision of 
domestic banking services and private debt flows and portfolio equity flows have formed a 
very small part of long term capital flows to the LDCs (Table 2).  Many LDCs have 
maintained their capital controls and domestic banks have not been exposed to complex asset 
based securities emanating from the industrial countries.   Of course, like other developing 
countries, since the beginning of the global financial crisis the LDCs have found it even more 
difficult to raise funding in the international markets and the premiums on trade credits that 
they can procure has substantially increased, with debilitating effect on their export sectors 
(IMF, 2009).  The LDCs where the banking sector is dominated by branches of foreign banks 
may be subjected to additional financial instability, depending on the way the global financial 
crisis has affected the parent foreign banks and the possibility of withdrawal of capital from 
the LDCs by these banks.  
The main source of long term private financing in the LDCs has been foreign direct 
investment.  From the late 1990s FDI flows to the LDCs have been growing fast, and 
                                                          
3
  Namely, Tanzania, Burkina Faso, Niger, Mali, Senegal, Benin, Togo, Uganda, The Gambia, Mozambique, 
Zambia, Guinea, Djibouti, and Lesotho in Africa and Cambodia in Asia (IMF 2009). 
4
 These countries are Benin, Togo, Uganda, The Gambia, Mozambique, Zambia, Guinea, Djibouti, and Lesotho. 
Table 2, Long term capital flows to the LDCs 2004-06
bn U.S. dolars Percent
2004 2005 2006 2004-06
Official flows
(1) 
16.3 17.6 17.6 61.8
Private net flows 10.8 9.8 11.2 38.2
   FDI 9.3 7.8 12.3 35.3
   Portfolio equity 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1
   Private lending 1.4 2.0 -1.6 2.2
Total excluding debt relief 27.1 27.4 28.8 100
Notes:  (1), excludes debt relief grants Source:  LDC report 2008
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Source: World Bank, GDF, December 2008.
Figure 13, Net FDI inflows and repatriated profits 
from the LDCs, 1980-2006
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Figure 14, Net FDI inflows and repatriated profits' 
African LDCs, 1980-2006
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Figure 15, Net FDI inflows and repatriated profits' 
Asian LDCs, 1980-2006
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particularly accelerating during the commodity boom period, reaching close to 40 per cent of 
total long term capital flows to the LDCs 
during 2004-06 (Figure 12, Table 2).  About 
84 per cent of total FDI to the LDCs during 
the entire 2000-07 period went to African 
LDCs and Haiti, and about 15 per cent to the 
Asian group.  During this period FDI 
constituted about 3.3 per cent of the gross 
national income in LDCs as a whole.  In 
African, Asian, and Island LDCs the shares 
were respectively about 4.8 per cent, 1.2 per cent and 3.2 per cent of the GNI.  According to 
UNCTAD estimates FDI financed about 15 per cent of gross fixed capital formation in the 
LDCs in 2006 (LDC Report 2008).     
The global crisis is likely to undermine the flow of FDI to the LDCs in a major way, as lack 
of access to funds by multinational companies and the fall in profitability of such investments 
due to commodity price collapse take their toll.  
Another important consideration is that about 
42 per cent of FDI inflows into the LDCs in 
2006 took the form of cross boarder mergers 
and acquisitions (UNCTAD, 2008), which is 
likely to shut off as a result of the credit 
crunch.  FDI in the form of greenfield 
investment in mineral and oil exporting 
countries may continue under its past 
momentum, as the gestation period in this type 
of investment is long and incomplete projects 
may continue to completion.  Investors may 
also continue investment in such cases due to 
long term strategic considerations and future 
access to the resources.   
 Along with the growth of FDI since the late 
1990s, repatriation of profits by foreign 
companies has also been growing apace.  Since 1994 repatriated profits have overtaken the 
Source: World Bank, GDF, December 2008.
Figure 12, Net FDI inflows, total LDC, 1980-2006
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flow of FDI into the LDCs (see, Figures 13 to 15).   In the case of the Asian LDCs this took 
place early on in 2000, and in African LDCs repatriated profits surpassed FDI only in 2004.  
To the extent that repatriated profits are derived from domestically oriented industries such as 
banking, with no direct contribution to exports, the collapse of FDI following the global 
financial crisis would be particularly serious for the balance of payments.  In any event, the 
collapse of FDI will have a serious debilitating effect on the long term growth prospects of the 
LDCs.   
 
2.3  The impact on Remittances 
 The contribution of workers 
remittances to many LDC economies is 
highly significant.  Workers remittances 
had a rapid growth during the 2000-07 
commodity boom years prior to the 
global financial crisis (Figure 16).  In 
the case of LDC countries where data 
are available the flow of remittances 
increased from $6.7 bn in 2000 to $16.6 
bn in 2007.  In the case of African 
LDCs remittance flows increased from 
$2.9 bn in 2000 to $6.4 bn and in Asian 
LDCs the increase was from $3.6 bn to 
$10 bn between 2000 and 2007.  The 
total remittance inflows for the LDC as 
a whole were well over FDI flows in 
this period.  In Asian LDCs labour 
remittance were over three times higher 
than net FDI inflows in 2007.  Though in the case of Island LDCs remittance flows are 
relatively low in absolute terms, as a share of GDP some Island LDCs show some of the 
highest remittance flows amongst the LDCs. 
Figure 17 shows remittance inflows as a percent of merchandize exports for 30 LDC countries 
with available data and where remittances are higher than 1 per cent of the exports.  In seven 
Table 3, Remittance flows to LDCs, 2000-07
(bn US $)
Year African Asian Island Total LDCs
2000 2.9 3.6 0.2 6.7
2001 3.2 3.8 0.2 7.2
2002 3.7 5.1 0.1 8.9
2003 4.5 5.5 0.1 10.1
2004 5.1 6.0 0.2 11.2
2005 5.1 7.1 0.2 12.4
2006 5.8 8.6 0.2 14.6
2007 6.4 10.1 0.2 16.7
Source:  World Bank, WDI
Figure 16,  Workers Remittances Received, 2000-07
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countries remittance flows are close to or well over 100 per cent of merchandize exports, and 
in more than half of the countries remittance flows constitute over 30 per cent of exports.  
Workers remittances in the LDCs mainly come from other developing countries in the 
vicinity that benefited from the commodity boom of the past few years.  The collapse of the 
commodity boom therefore is likely to have a dramatic effect on the remittance flows.  
According to World Bank projections, remittance flows to developing countries are likely to 
decline in 2009, possibly by as much as 5 per cent (World Bank, 2009).  This will be a further 
significant negative shock to the LDCs in addition to those arising from the trade and capital 
markets. 
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Figure 17, Workers remittances as per cent of merchandize exports, 2007
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The significance of workers remittances for the LDC economies goes beyond their 
macroeconomic role of foreign exchange and income provision.  Workers remittances often 
form a large part of the income of the poor households.  Savings by migrant workers are also 
important sources of funds for investment in small enterprises and can play a significant role 
in employment generation.  In addition, poor households use migration as a source of income 
diversification and an insurance strategy against frequent internal shocks to which LDC 
economies are prone.  The fact that currently the collapse of remittance income has coincided 
with a slump in the domestic economy resulting from negative trade and investment shocks 
undermines this strategy and intensifies poverty.  The coincidence of these three major 
negative shocks in the wake of the world financial crisis also pushes to the limit the coping 
strategies of LDC economies as a whole. 
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Source:  World Bank, WDI.
Table 4, External Resource Gap as a per cent of Investment and Government
Expenditure 1980-2007
African LDCs
(1)
Asian LDCs Island LDCs
Percentage of gross domestic investment
1980-84 94.3 45.1 86.0
1985-89 67.4 48.7 94.7
1990-94 87.7 54.7 92.3
1995-99 80.1 41.9 97.3
2000-04 94.2 29.3 108.9
2004-07 81.0 35.5 97.4
Percentage of government consumption expenditure
1980-84 96.1 46.4 121.6
1985-89 68.3 49.9 115.6
1990-94 87.6 60.0 103.4
1995-99 82.1 48.8 107.9
2000-04 94.1 32.1 109.1
2004-07 80.8 39.8 98.0
Notes:  1.  Excluding African Oil Exporters.                   Source: World Bank, WDI
Figure 18, External resource gap in African, Asian, and Island LDCs as a 
percentage of GDP, 1960-2007
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2.4  Official Development Assistance 
In advanced industrial countries the reaction to the crisis has been massive fiscal stimulus, 
drastic reductions in central banks lending rates, and monetary easing through purchase of 
long term financial assets by the central bank.  This has taken place in addition to massive 
injection of funds into financial institutions and financial assistance to strategic ailing 
industries.  In addition, the industrial countries have inbuilt stabilization mechanisms, such as 
unemployment insurance, which during the economic downturn to some extent alleviates the 
effect of the recession.  Such inbuilt stabilization mechanisms do not exist in the LDCs.  As 
such, the LDCs may appear more in need of countercyclical monetary and fiscal measures.  
The nature of the economic crisis in the LDCs, however, is different from the industrial 
countries.  Furthermore, the LDC governments and central banks face severe constraints in 
introducing expansionary fiscal and monetary measures during economic downturn.  This 
signifies the importance of ODA for the LDCs in coping with the crisis. 
 The most severe binding constraint for 
LDC policy makers is the balance of 
payment constraint, which due to the global 
crisis is likely to become even more 
binding.   In recent decades the LDCs have 
been highly dependent on external sources 
of finance, well above the norms in other 
developing countries.  The external 
resource gap for Island LDCs has fluctuated 
between 20 to 25 per cent of the GDP over 
the past two decades.  The same figure for 
African LDCs (excluding oil exporters) has 
been between 15 to 20 per cent and for 
Asian LDCs around 5 to 10 per cent (Figure 
18).  Only some of the oil exporting LDCs 
managed to reverse these trends over the 
past decade to generate sizable current 
account surpluses.   
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 Table 4 shows the dominance of external funding in relation to investment and government 
consumption expenditure in the LDCs.  In non-oil African LDCs external resource gap has 
been on average above 80 per cent of total investment and government expenditure, and in 
Island LDCs these ratios have been on average above 90 per cent.  In average Asian LDCs 
external resource gap has fluctuated between 30 to 60 per cent of investment and government 
consumption expenditure (Table 4). 
 The external resource gap in the LDCs has been covered through a number of channels.  
Workers remittances and FDI, as discussed previously, have made varying degrees of 
contribution in different LCDs (for the median LDC country the combined contribution of the 
two has been about 8 per cent of the GDP in recent years).  On the negative side, profit 
repatriation and foreign debt service further add to external resource gap (combined effect of 
the two for all the LDCs has been about 6 per cent of GNI in recent years).  The net effect of 
these flows for average LDC country is likely to be small, though wide variations exit across 
individual countries.  It is noteworthy, however, that the positive flows such as workers 
remittances and FDI are negatively impacted during the global crisis, while the outflows such 
as debt service payments are not affected. 
Other sources of financing the resource gap are raising funds from the international capital 
markets and portfolio financing.   As noted above, however, the LDCs have had very little 
success in procuring this type of long 
term financing.  As shown in Figure 
19, at the height of commodity price 
boom during 2004-06, even including 
the oil exporting LDCs, African and 
Asian LDCs on average managed to 
raise funds equivalent to only about 
0.5 per cent of their GDP in this 
manner.  In the post crisis era, at a 
time when the seizing of private 
financial flows to many emerging market economies has intensified economic instability in 
many developing countries, this source of financing will be a fortiori closed to the LDCs.    
The above highlights the fact that the LDCs are highly dependent on foreign aid in financing 
their external resource gap.   As shown in Figures 20 and 21, foreign aid for average African 
and Asian LDCs mirrors the external resource gap as a share of GNI and gross investment.   
Source, World Bank, WDI
Figure 19, Financing via international capital markets, % of 
GDP, 2004-06
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
African LDCs Asian LDCs Island LDCs
p
er
 c
en
t
 15 
Since the late 1980s in African LDCs on average over 100 per cent of gross investment has 
been financed by foreign aid, and in Asian LDCs the average figure has been around 50 per 
cent.  
Source: World Bank, WDI.  Notes: Excluding oil exporters
Figure 21, Aid as per cent of gross investment, 1980-
2006
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Figure 20, Aid as per cent of gross national income, 
1980-2006
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Ideally one would presume foreign aid to be treated as a policy variable that could be relied 
upon to pursue counter cyclical policies in the LDCs over the economic cycle.  This ideal 
situation also appears to be the assumption behind various donors pronouncements regarding 
the magnitude and modality of aid flows; e.g., the programme of action for the LDCs for the 
decade 2001-2010.  But the reality of aid is far from this ideal, as many donors have fallen 
short of their aid commitments even during normal times.  Rather than treating aid as an 
exogenous policy variable, many analysts have come to the conclusion that aid is best treated 
as an endogenous variable which has many determinations, amongst which economic 
conditions in the donor countries are most paramount.  Particularly during the current crisis, 
as the budgets of many donor governments have come under extreme pressure, it is likely that 
the flow of ODA through conventional channels may be curtailed.  According to latest IMF 
projections, a thirty per cent reduction in ODA is likely in 2009 on the basis of some large 
donor countries indicating planned reductions in aid.  Furthermore, the modalities and time 
responsiveness of the existing aid channels may not be adequate, even if aid can be increased, 
given the size and rapidity of the impact of the current global crisis.   
One of the paradoxical features of the LDC economies in recent years has been a rapid build 
up of foreign exchange reserves in economies which are heavily indebted, have large current 
account deficits, and are aid dependent (Figures 22 and 23).  This is sometimes justified on 
grounds of unreliability and instability of aid flows, which is more a portrayal of the 
dysfunctional and uncoordinated aid system than a justification for relatively large waste of 
resources in some of the poorest countries on earth.  The question that concerns us here, 
 16 
however, is to what extent the relatively large foreign exchange reserves in some of the LDCs 
provide a cushion to pursue countercyclical policies during the current crisis.   
The answer depends on the relative size of the combined effect of the negative external 
shocks to the accumulated reserves.  Countries like Yemen with foreign exchange reserves 
equivalent to almost one year of imports can in the short run introduce countercyclical fiscal 
and monetary policies to somewhat alleviate the effect of the crisis.  Whether such policy 
freedom is worth carrying such large foreign exchange reserves over long periods of time is 
however another matter.  The very neglect of investment in productive capacities in that past 
can in fact render such expansionary policies ineffectual. 
Source: World Bank, WDI
Figure 23, Foreign exchange Reserves as % of 
GDP, 2000 and 2007
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Figure 22, Foreign reserves in moths of imports
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Furthermore, counter cyclical policies through monetary expansion at a time of crisis can lead 
to fast depletion of the foreign exchange reserves through capital flight.  For this reason, 
amongst others, capital controls and strict supervision of the banking system in the LDCs 
during the crisis is of utmost importance.  Nevertheless, given the size, severity, and 
multidimensionality of the negative shocks hitting the LDC economies, no credible 
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macroeconomic policy to counter the short term effects of the crisis can work on the basis of 
the existing reserves and without adequate supply of new external resources (see, Section 7 
below).  The alternative of letting the economy adjust to external shocks without the injection 
of new external resources will take a sever toll in terms of economic growth and poverty.   
 
3. Implications for growth and poverty 
The impact of the global crisis on economic growth in different LDCs would vary according 
to the nature of the LDC economy, its mode of integration into the global economy, and of 
course the policy response by the LDC governments.  There are, however, common 
characteristics amongst the LDCs which limit their policy space and condition their capacities 
to deal with the impact of the crisis.  An important characteristic of the LDCs which limits 
their policy space is the phenomenon of generalized or mass poverty.  This is signified by the 
fact that the majority of the LDC population lives below the World Bank’s global poverty 
lines of $1 or $2 a day (LDC report 2008).  The global poverty lines are defined in 1993 
purchasing power parity exchange rates, which translate to 20 to 60 cents in current dollars 
for each dollar of 1993 PPP rate in various LDCs.    
 In order to get a better idea of the 
implications of generalized poverty for the 
LDCs ability to cope with external shocks, 
Figure 24 reports the proportion of the 
population in different LDCs that live below 
$1 a day in 2005 at current exchange rates.  
The estimates are based on national accounts 
consumption data and the latest available 
income distribution data.  It is evident that the 
majority of the population in LDCs live 
below $1 a day at current exchange rates.  In 
fact on a population weighted basis, more 
than 82 per cent of the LDC population 
consumes less than one dollar a day at current 
values.   The $1 a day standard here is of 
course non-comparable in terms of standards 
Figure 24, Per cent of populat in living below $1 a day 
(at current US dollars)
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of living across the countries, as price levels vary between countries.  But they nevertheless 
convey the important information that if the entire consumption basket, and a fortiori its 
tradable component, is exchanged at current international values, for most of the LDC 
population this will amount to less than $1 a day.   
 This highlights the extreme resource constraints that the LDCs confront in normal 
circumstances and the limits that this poses for their ability to adjust to the huge external 
shocks emanating from the international economy.  One indication of this is the relatively low 
magnitude of what the LDC report 2000 referred to as domestic resources available for 
finance (DRAF).  DRAF is defined as GDP minus household consumption, which in the case 
of the LDCs can be interpreted as domestic resources potentially available for investment and 
spending on public services.  DRAF is shown in Figure 25 as a share of GDP for average 
LDC and for 110 other developing countries.    Since the early 1980s the LDCs on average 
have had DRAF rate of about 18 per cent of the GDP, less than half of the 36.4 per cent in the 
case of other developing countries 
average (Figure 25).  The extreme 
resource constraints under which the 
LDC policy makers have to function 
becomes particularly clear once it is 
recognized that the low DRAF rates 
in these countries are combined with 
extremely low private consumption 
levels, in the case of the majority of 
households not very far from the edge 
of poverty.  A comparison with per 
capita consumption trends in other 
developing countries, as shown in 
Figure 26, makes it clear that low 
DRAF rates in the LDCs are not due 
to high consumption levels, but are 
more a symptom of extremely low productivity levels and lack of productive capacities in the 
LDCs.  
 These circumstances severely constrain the policy space in the LDCs even in normal times.  
The same phenomenon is also the cause of aid dependence of many African and Asian LDCs, 
Source: Based on World Bank WDI.
Figure 26, Per capita Household Consumption in LDCs and Other 
Developing Countries, 1980-2007
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Figure 25, Domestic resources available for finance (DRAF), LDCs 
and other Developing countries, 1980-2007
0
10
20
30
40
50
1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006
%
 o
f 
G
D
P
LDCs excl. oil exporter LDCs Other DCs
 19 
which itself can further crowd out the policy space due to the lack of coordination and 
unreliability of aid flows as well as externally imposed conditionality.  The extremely low 
levels of DRAF in the LDCs is the counterpart of the large external resource gaps and current 
account deficits discussed in the previous sections.   Under the prevailing conditions of the 
LDC economies, such large current account deficits cannot be treated as simply a matter of 
overvalued exchange rates.   Under the conditions of generalized poverty there may exist no 
real exchange rate which can maintain current account balance without pushing a large part of 
the population below extreme poverty levels.  This is another example of policy constraints 
facing the LDCs which emanates from the condition of generalized poverty and necessitates 
reliance on external resources even under normal conditions.   
It is significant that during the recent growth episode prior to the global crisis the LDC 
economies exhibited significant improvement in their DRAF rate, increasing from about 17 
per cent of the GDP in 2002 to over 25 per cent in 2007 (Figure 25).  This was the case for 
both the oil exporting and non-oil exporting LDCs, and in fact in 25 out of 39 Asian and 
African LDCs for which data is available, or seventy per cent of the countries, DRAF rate 
increased appreciably between 2000 and 2007.  The fact that during the same period real per 
capita consumption remained relatively stable (Figure 26), highlights the serious effort made 
by the LDCs to mobilize domestic resources for their development.   The continuation of this 
process would in time lead to a situation where the LDCs, having built up enough productive 
capacities, will no longer be dependent on foreign assistance.  The arrival of such major 
multiple shocks due to the global economic crisis, however, would not only jeopardize this 
process, but also without additional and appropriately directed external assistance it could 
lead to the collapse of the growth process and intensified poverty in the LDCs. 
The impact of the global crisis on levels and intensity of poverty in the LDCs works through 
various direct and indirect channels discussed in the previous sections.  The most immediate 
and direct channel is through its impact on economic growth, employment, and wages.  
However, some of the transmission mechanisms are more prone to impact the low income 
groups more than others and hence affect poverty through distributional changes as well.  
Workers remittances for example form a much higher share of income of the low income 
families and the decline in remittances is likely to intensify poverty by more than its apparent 
overall income effect.  In addition to income generation, migration also plays an insurance 
role for low income families by diversifying their income sources.  The concomitant negative 
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shock of declining remittances and the slowdown of the domestic economy would hit the poor 
particularly hard. 
Other more indirect mechanisms work through the impact of the crisis on government 
revenues, by diminishing the provision of social services vital to the poor, particularly at a 
time when the need for such services has increased.  A similar effect will result if the crisis 
leads to a diminution in ODA directed to such social services.  Deficiencies in the provision 
of health and educational services will have further adverse long term influences on growth 
and poverty.   
To the extent that the global crisis has led to the fall in food and fuel prices it can somewhat 
alleviate the extent and intensity of poverty, as these are significant items in the consumption 
basket of the poor. However, if the crisis at the same time leads to abrupt devaluation of the 
exchange rate, e.g., due to flight of capital from the LDCs to more safe havens, these 
beneficial effects will not materialize.  Similar forces can lead to an increase in interest rates 
in the LDCs, with negative effects on investment and employment, further hitting the poor.  It 
is unlikely that the LDCs can face these challenges without adequate and well directed 
external assistance.  The alternative is considerable increase in poverty in the short run and a 
possible derailment of their growth process for some years to come. 
 The full impact of the global crisis on the poverty in the LDCs, taking into account its direct, 
indirect and distributional effects, is best assessed by detailed country case studies.  There is 
furthermore a great deal of uncertainty as to the depth and length of the unfolding global 
crisis, with important implications for LDC poverty.  To get some idea of the orders of 
magnitude involved and assess the sensitivity of poverty to the multiple external shocks 
emanating from the crisis, projections of the impact of the crisis based on the latest available 
growth projections for the LDCs are shown in Figures 27 and 28 for the Asian and African 
LDCs.  These estimates are based on the projections of the impact of the crisis on GDP 
growth in LDCs in 2009 and 2010 by the IMF.
5
   
Baseline projections derive from the assumption that economic growth in the LDCs continues 
uninterrupted at the same trend growth rate as prevailed during the five years prior to the 
global crisis, i.e., the 2003-07 period average.  Under the baseline assumptions, headcount 
poverty – measured as the share of the population living below $1 a day – declines in both the 
                                                          
5
  See IMF World Economic Outlook 2009 and 2008.  The impact of the global crisis on LDC growth is taken 
here as the difference between IMF projections of GDP growth in WEO 2008 and 2009 in these countries.   
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Asian and African LDCs.
6
  However, in the African LDCs the number of the poor increases 
even under the baseline projections due to the fact that population grows faster than poverty 
rates decline.   
Figure 27, Headcount poverty in African LDCs
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Figure 28, Headcount poverty in Asian LDCs
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Figure 28, Headcount poverty in Asian LDCs
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The impact of the crisis is projected to lead to a considerable increase in the number of the 
poor in the LDCs.  As a result of the crisis, by 2010 the number of the poor in African LDCs 
will be higher by an additional 8.8 million, and in Asian LDCs by 0.7 million, with a 
combined effect of 9.5 million.  These are conservative estimates, as they do not take into 
acc unt the impact of the crisis on income distribution and its indirect impact on public 
service provision for the poor.  Furthermore at the time of writing, though the financial crisis 
in the industrialized countries seems to be abating, unemployment continues to increase and 
growth of production and trade continues to be revised downwards.   Since  the main 
transmission mechanisms of the global crisis for the LDCs is through the real economy 
effects, this does not bode well for the LDCs and the above poverty projections can turn out to 
be too optimistic.
7
   
 
 
 
                                                          
6
  Poverty estimates are based on poverty line $1.08 a day in 1993 PPP rates using the same methodology as in 
Karshenas (2008).  The methodology was devised for estimating national accounts consistent poverty estimates 
for LDCs for the Least Developed Countries branch at UNCTAD, Geneva.  I am grateful to LDC branch, 
UNCTAD for the use of the data and methodology for this study. 
7
  These estimates should be treated as tentative with a relatively high margin of error depending on the accuracy 
of IMF projections of GDP growth.  For example, World Bank (2010) projections of growth in LDC countries in 
South Asia suggests a much higher impact of global crisis, with the result that the increase in poverty rates in 
Asian LDCs will be double those estimated on the basis of the IMF projections. 
 
 22 
4.  Financing Needs and Policies to Mitigate the Impact of the Crisis in the LDCs 
 The poverty estimates for 2009 in the previous section are based on IMF projections of GDP 
growth resulting from the external shocks and the economic adjustment that are likely to take 
place in the LDC economies accordingly.  Considering the unacceptable poverty outcomes of 
the projected growth rates from the viewpoint of achieving the Millennium goals of income 
poverty, and given that the shocks to the LDC economies are external and considered to be 
temporary, one may approach the question of the financing needs of the LDCs by examining 
the financial implications of possible alternative adjustments.    
4.1 Financing Needs of the LDCs 
The IMF projections of the size of initial balance of payments shock arising from the global 
crisis is the combined result of the shocks to export volumes, terms of trade, remittances, and 
FDI flows.  This initial shock is combined with other assumptions regarding economic 
adjustment to arrive at baseline growth projections, estimates of foreign exchange reserve 
depletion, etc.  We start with this initial balance of payments shock, in order to highlight the 
orders of magnitude of financing needs of the LDCs under other possible adjustments.   
The size of the balance of payment shock in 2009, as a percentage of total foreign exchange 
reserves at the beginning of the period, for the LDCs is shown in Figure 29.  The LDC 
economies that are excluded from the Figure have a positive balance of payments shock, 
presumably due to the fall in fuel and food import prices.  As can be seen, for most LDCs 
experiencing a negative shock, the balance of payments shock is well over 50 per cent of 
foreign exchange reserves.   At this rate foreign exchange reserves will be depleted fast.  In 
fact the rapid depletion of foreign reserves can snowball as adverse expectations may give rise 
to capital flight and further exacerbating the initial shock.   
Another way of looking at the relative magnitude of the balance of payment shocks to the 
LDC economies is to compare them with the IMF quotas of the LDCs.  The rapid-access 
component of the modified Exogenous Shock Facility (ESF) of the IMF provides funding up 
to 25 per cent of the quota for each LDC, and its high-access component up to 75 per cent of 
the quota.  Figure 30 shows the balance of payment shocks to the LDCs as a percentage of 
each country’s IMF quota.  In over 75 percent of the LDCs, the magnitude of the projected 
balance of payment loss in 2009 is well over 100 per cent of the country’s quota.  This, apart 
from showing the inadequacies of the current facilities for low income countries, also 
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demonstrates the large magnitude of the combined external shocks hitting the LDC economies 
at this time. 
Source:  Based on IMF (2009) Source:  Based on IMF (2009)
Figure 29,  Projected post-crisis balance of payment shock as a percentage 
of total reserves in LDCs, 2009
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Figure 30,  Projected post-crisis balance of payment shock as a percentage 
of IMF quota in LDCs, 2009
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Some kind of adjustment in the LDC economies is certainly needed.  In fact, the negative 
external shocks will themselves bring about a great deal of adjustment in the economy 
through the various deflationary mechanisms discussed in the previous sections.  This, 
however, will not be satisfactory as it will inevitably intensify poverty and can undermine the 
long term growth prospects of the economies affected as well.  Appropriately designed and 
well directed policies, combined with adequate external assistance can substantially improve 
the adjustment process and its outcomes. The IMF projections of economic growth in the 
LDCs are based on one set of assumptions regarding such policies, taking into account the 
existing aid commitments and grants.  Considering the existing domestic resource constraints 
facing the LDCs, it is unlikely that the LDCs can improve their performance much more than 
the IMF projections without additional external resources – of course within the bounds of the 
uncertainties associated with such projections in general.    
The combined balance of payments shock to the LDCs due to the global crisis constitutes an 
immediate income loss to these economies.  A measure of such income loss for the LDCs as a 
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whole can put in context the dimensions of the problems faced by these economies in the 
wake of the global crisis and give some idea of the magnitude of additional external gap that 
needs to filled one way or another.  Figure 31 shows the value of income loss due to adverse 
external shocks in 2009 for the LDC countries as a group as well as a sub-group of LDCs that 
the IMF (2009) has classified as highly vulnerable to the global crisis.  The value of foreign 
exchange reserves for the countries in each group is also shown.  The total income loss to the 
LDCs is estimated to be about $71.5 bn dollars in 2009.  This compares with $28.2 billion 
dollars net ODA received by the LDCs in 2006, and is $30 bn dollars, or more than 70 per 
cent, higher than the combined foreign exchange reserves in the LDCs that are negatively 
affected by the global crisis.  In the case of the highly vulnerable LDCs, the income loss is 
$20.7 bn which is four times the foreign exchange reserves of the countries in that group, and 
not far from the entire net average annual ODA to the LDCs as a whole during 2000-05. 
Source:  Based on IMF (2009)
Figure 31, Forein exchange reserves and Income loss due to the balance of 
payments shock in LDCs and highly vulnerable LDCs, 2009 
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These estimates constitute considerable income shock relative to the size of the LDC 
economies resulting from the initial impact of the crisis.  In both the overall LDC group and 
the highly vulnerable LDC group, they constitute over 30 per cent of the GDP of the countries 
included in each group.   Even if we allow for half of this to be absorbed by utilizing foreign 
exchange reserves and possibly front loading some future aid commitments, the LDC 
economies as a whole will be still faced with an additional deficit equivalent to 15 per cent of 
the GDP.  This is not of course distributed across the countries equally.  Some countries are 
hit harder than others, e.g., oil and mineral exporting LDCs, and a particular country’s burden 
may not be necessarily proportional to its ability to cope with the shock.  It is also important 
to keep in mind that the existing projections are likely to contain a large margin of error, 
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particularly when based on forecasts of highly volatile items such as commodity prices.  
Nevertheless, it is clear that any credible macroeconomic framework for poverty reduction in 
the LDCs has to allow for access to sizable contingency funds to cope with multiple negative 
shocks of the type confronting the LDCs at this time.   Appropriate policies to mitigate the 
impact of the global crisis in the LDCs, therefore, need to have both a global and a national 
component. 
 
4.2   Policies at the Global and Regional Levels 
The global financial crisis has led to unprecedented coordinated attempts by governments in 
major economies to ease the credit crunch and to stimulate the real economy through 
expansionary fiscal and monetary policies.  To the extent that these measures are successful in 
shortening the length and reduce the intensity of the global crisis, they will be highly 
beneficial to the LDCs as well.  To mitigate the impact of the crisis on the LDCs, however, 
additional specific policies are also urgently required at the global level.  This is particularly 
critical for the LDC economies, as they lack the necessary policy space to deal with the 
negative shocks emanating from the global crisis.  The extremely limited policy space in the 
LDCs means that without the necessary measures at the international level, the global crisis 
will lead to massive increases in poverty in the LDCs in the short run and the derailment of 
the growth process in these economies with substantial negative impact for global economic 
growth in the medium and the long run. 
This is recognized by international community as testified by action plans by international 
financial institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank and the regional development 
banks, as well as the references made to the predicament of the low income countries in The 
Global Plan for Recovery and Reform by G20 following its London meeting in April 2009.  
The G20 agreement constituted a $1.1 trillion programme of support, in addition to the 
existing resources of the multilateral financial institutions, to restore credit in the global 
economy.  In particular the resources available to the IMF are tripled to $750 billion, and 
SDR allocations are to be increased by $250 bn.  The Plan supports a further increase in 
lending by Multilateral Development Banks by an additional $100 bn.   
The G20 communiqué recognizes the disproportionate impact of the crisis on the vulnerable 
groups in the poorest countries and its potential long lasting impact on the global economy.  It 
reaffirms the commitment to meeting the Millennium Development Goals and the need to 
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fulfil the ODA pledges, including debt relief and the Gleneagles commitments to achieve 
these goals.  The plan stipulates that $50 bn of the entire additional resources committed to 
combat the global crisis can be earmarked for the low income countries, and a further $6 bn is 
pledged from the sale of IMF gold to provide concessional funding to the poorest countries 
over the next 2 to 3 years.  
Along with the provision of additional funds, the IMF has also overhauled its lending and 
conditionality framework with a view to enhancing the anti-cyclical effect of its lending 
during the crisis.  This is embodied in its new Flexible Credit Line (FCL) and high access 
precautionary arrangements (HAPAS).  The new conditionality framework is based on pre-set 
qualification criteria, and reforms are to be monitored in the context of programme reviews 
rather than the use of structural performance criteria.  The IMF is also reviewing its debt 
sustainability framework with a view to enhancing its flexibility.   
The substantial increase in credit facilities along with greater flexibility and speed of access to 
credit are critical elements of the internationally coordinated attempts to cope with the global 
recession.  The new facilities however are likely to benefit more the stronger emerging market 
and developing economies than the LDCs.  It is unlikely that the LDCs would qualify for the 
new FCL facility of the IMF.  Amongst the criteria for assessing qualification for an FCL, the 
IMF enumerates (i) a sustainable external position; (ii) a capital account position dominated 
by private flows; (iii) a track record of steady sovereign access to international capital markets 
at favourable terms, etc. Even the envisioned doubling of the SDR allocations to the LDCs 
will not make but a slight dent in resource requirements to deal with the balance of payment 
shocks inflicted by the global crisis.  The $6 bn pledged from the sale of the IMF gold is 
equally dwarfed by the size of the LDC resource gap.  The $50 bn allocation to the low 
income countries needs to be front loaded and fast tracked through the multilateral 
development banks in order to make a significant impact on crisis damage prevention in 2009.  
As late as 25 of April 2009, the communiqué of the international financial committee of the 
board of governors of the IMF calls for ‘rapid completion of the reform of the Fund’s 
facilities for low-income countries to make them more responsive to diverse country needs, 
and the review of options to enhance the flexibility of debt sustainability framework’.  It 
appears that both in terms of the amount of resources committed and the speed of response, 
the international community has not given priority to the to the requirements of the LDCs.  It 
is true that a successful revival of global growth and trade will benefit the LDCs more than 
marginal increases in short term finance, but the contribution of the LDC economies with a 
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population of over 400 million to world demand should not be lost sight of.  Every dollar 
spent in low income LDCs will have a much higher marginal impact on the revival of world 
demand than in high income countries.  It should be also noted that the financing needs of the 
LDCs to cope with the adverse shocks due to the global crisis may appear large relative to the 
size of the LDC economies, but they are relatively small (indeed minuscule) in comparison to 
the fiscal and monetary stimuli provided by the governments in the advanced economies in 
the wake of the financial crisis.   
In fact if all DAC member countries fulfil their Brussels Programme of Action targets for aid 
for only one year, the funds will be more than sufficient to cover the financing needs of the 
LDCs resulting from the global crisis in 2009.  According to OECD DAC (2009), the total 
ODA allocation to LDCs during 2006-07 constituted 0.09 per cent of the GNI of DAC 
member countries.  To put things in perspective, it is worth noting that as a result of the 
financial crisis the public debt of advanced OECD countries is projected to increase to over 
100 per cent of their GNI by 2010 (OECD 2009).  A doubling of LDC aid budget in 2009 
would increase the national public debt in donor countries to 100.09 of their GNI -- hardly 
more than a rounding off error for the donors public debt but vital for the lives of more than 
400 million LDC inhabitants. 
The financing needs of the LDCs during the crisis, however, go beyond the availability of 
flexible balance of payment support funding.  The economic crisis has led to a decline in 
government revenues, and given the fiscal constraints in the LDCs, without additional 
budgetary support this can lead to a decline in vital core social expenditures.  Extra aid is 
therefore required in order to protect the existing social spending vital to the achievement of 
the MDGs, let alone counter cyclical expansionary measures.  As the economic crisis will 
itself most likely lead to increased spending requirements for social protection, further 
additional aid is required just to maintain the current standards.  It is therefore vital that the 
DAC member countries meet their ODA pledges, and provide this in the form of budget 
support, preferably through the multilateral agencies and international development banks.  If 
all the OECD/DAC member countries meet their ODA commitments of 0.15 per cent of GNI, 
pledged at the Brussels Programme of Action, the funds will be sufficient to safeguard vital 
social spending in the LDCs, and in addition provide funding for investment in infrastructure 
and agriculture, critical for macroeconomic stabilization in the short run and laying the 
foundations for future growth.  Along with additional funding, the international community 
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should help bolster the institutional capacities of recipient countries and facilitate the LDC 
government planning and budgeting processes and ownership of the new initiatives. 
As to the modalities of the delivery of new finance to the LDCs, the existing multilateral 
development agencies are better positioned to deliver resources with the required rapidity and 
flexibility than the bilateral routs.  The World Bank’s Financial Crisis Response Fast Track 
Facility (FTF) and Rapid Social Response Facility (RSR), and the African Development 
Bank’s Emergency Liquidity Facility (ELF) are new initiatives based on the existing 
resources of the two institutions (World Bank 2009a and AfDB 2009).  The Asian 
Development Bank (ADB) has also set up demand based support for what it terms as the 
Asian New Deal to combat the impact of the global crisis.  A recapitalization of the 
multilateral development agencies is necessary to deal with the scale of the current crisis, with 
the proviso that transfers are made without unjustified conditionality and respect the country 
ownership of her policies and initiatives. This is also vital for effective coordination of crisis 
management efforts.  As highlighted in the G-20 Working Group Report (2009) and the UN 
Commission of Experts (2009), in the longer term a restructuring of aid architecture towards a 
more predictable, coordinated, transparent, and flexible system is necessary. 
Another area where global action is needed to avert the intensity of the impact of the crisis on 
the LDCs is in trade protection area.  Protectionist measures in other countries will affect the 
vulnerable poor in the LDCs negatively.  The pressures for such protection through the 
introduction of new product standards, labelling requirements etc. should be averted.  
Subsidies to bailout failing industries and income subsidies to agriculture in more advanced 
countries impose unfair competition on producers in the LDCs who do not have recourse to 
such subsidies.   Income subsidies to cotton farmers in the advanced countries cost some 
LDCs more than what they receive in the form of concessionary aid.  Pledges to open up the 
advanced country markets to the products of LDCs should be fulfilled. 
 
4.3   National Level Policies 
Of course financing may appear to be the most significant stumbling block, but it is not the 
most important aspect of policy design to deal with the impact of the global crisis on the 
LDCs.  It is vital that LDC countries produce their own detailed appraisal of the impact of the 
crisis, their financing needs under different contingencies, and specific policies to deal with 
the impact within the macroeconomic framework of their PRSP.   
 29 
The crisis will inevitably hit the government budgets in LDCs on both the revenue and 
expenditure sides.  Revenues fall precisely at a time when the need for expenditures on social 
protection and social services expands.  LDC governments should protect their budgetary 
allocations to education, health and social welfare in real terms.  This may imply a sizable 
increase in budget allocations to these sectors as social protection coverage of increasing 
numbers of the poor is maintained.   
Investment in infrastructure, agricultural extension and other capacity enhancing activities are 
normally the first to be axed during periods of budgetary entrenchment.  Given the entirely 
exogenous and temporary nature of the current crisis, however, such investments need to be 
maintained and even increased.  Expansion of government investment in employment 
generating public works with low import content can play an even more important role in 
poverty reduction than the direct social protection measures.    
Countercyclical fiscal policy in the LDCs, therefore, needs to be based on specific 
employment generation and poverty reduction initiatives and is very different from the 
classical Keynesian demand management policies which forms the core of stimulus packages 
in advanced economies.  Given the extremely limited fiscal space in the LDCs, cooperation of 
the donor community in the design and financing of such initiatives is a vital part of the 
counter cyclical measures in the LDCs during the current global crisis. 
Though the LDCs were less severely affected by the global credit crunch in the early phase of 
the financial crisis in 2008 than other developing and emerging market economies, it is 
important that they closely monitor their domestic banking sector as the weaknesses of the 
real economy can lead to loan defaults and increase the fragility of the banking system at later 
stages.   
Another prong of countercyclical policy in LDC economies relates to the revival of 
investment in the private sector by monetary and credit policies.  Where the decline in 
investment has been due to the collapse of exports resulting from the drying up of short term 
trade credits, or rising cost of trade finance, this has to be dealt with by providing official 
guarantees and resorting to trade finance facilities provided by multilateral development 
banks.  Another important instrument which should be used to stimulate private investment is 
the provision of subsidized credit for investment in specific sectors.   
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5.  Concluding Remarks 
The impact of the global economic crisis on different LDCs is highly varied, particularly 
depending on the nature of their trade specialization.  The overall shock according to the 
existing projections, however, appears sizable and requires drastic action, both on the part of 
the LDC countries themselves and the international donor community.  Such action should be 
guided by the realities on the ground in the LDCs as well as the nature of the shocks arising 
from the global crisis.  Some of these can be identified at a general level, and others need to 
be worked out on a case by case basis.   
At a general level, three important characteristics of the multiple shocks hitting the LDC 
economies need to be noted.  First, the shocks are exogenous and entirely outside the control 
of the LDCs and not of their making.  Secondly, despite the lack of certainty about the 
intensity and duration of the global crisis, the shocks should be treated as temporary as far as 
the LDC economies are concerned.  These two characteristics imply that any remedial 
measures taken by the LDCs should not affect the basic strategies of development or the 
fundamental structural features of these economies.  If there are grounds for such changes, 
they should be justified accordingly and not on the basis of the current conjuncture.  Though 
the current situation can highlight some of the flaws of the existing institutional and 
regulatory arrangements and pave the way for bringing about change in a manner that gives 
the LDCs greater leeway in protecting themselves from such external shocks.  
The third characteristic of the current adverse shocks hitting the LDCs relates to the sheer size 
of these shocks compared to the resources that the LDCs can muster both internally and in 
relation to the current ODA budgets.  As to the domestically generated resources, we have 
observed that the LDCs suffering from generalized or mass poverty, even under normal 
circumstances have to rely on external resources to finance vital public services and 
investments.  As we have also observed in this report, during the growth episode prior to the 
global crisis, the LDCs showed considerable effort in mobilizing newly generated domestic 
resources to finance their development at the expense of current consumption.  The promising 
trends in growing domestic resources available for financing developmental expenditures 
(DRAF) can be jeopardized due to the adverse shocks arising from the global crisis.  Under 
current IMF baseline projections of the impact of the crisis on economic growth in LDCs, the 
crisis can considerably add to poverty in the LDCs and will jeopardize the achievement of the 
Millennium Development Goals. 
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The initial impact of the global crisis is estimated to amount to a total income loss for the 
LDCs of about $71.5 bn dollars in 2009.  This is about 30 per cent of the GDP of the affected 
LDCs and compares with $28.2 billion dollars net ODA received by the LDCs in 2006.  The 
impact is of course varied across the different LDCs, but the estimated total impact puts in 
perspective the orders of magnitude involved and the nature of the required effort to avert 
large scale poverty increases and possible adverse effects on long term growth prospects of 
the LDCs.   
The financing needs of each LDC economy to cope with the adverse shocks due to the global 
crisis are large relative to the size of each economy, but relatively small in comparison to the 
fiscal and monetary stimuli provided by the governments in the advanced economies in the 
wake of the financial crisis.  In fact if all DAC member countries fulfil their Brussels 
Programme of Action targets for aid for only one year, the funds will be more than sufficient 
to cover the financing needs of the LDCs resulting from the global crisis in 2009.  External 
finance, however, can be only materialized and put to effective use within a credible policy 
framework which forms the basis for cooperation between development partners.  This 
requires measures taken both at the national LDC level and at the international level. 
At the national level: 
 To limit the damage inflicted by the global crisis, the LDCs require counter-cyclical 
spending.  Rather than being viewed as general short term demand management tools, 
stimulus packages in the context of the LDCs need to be specifically tailored to their 
conditions for optimum results. 
 In the face of declining government revenues the LDC governments should try to 
maintain their real spending per user in education, health, and social protection.  
Increased demand for such services during the crisis will induce a good deal of counter-
cyclicality to government spending.   
 Since the crisis has been caused by factors entirely external to the LDCs, and as it is a 
temporary phenomenon, government investment should be also defended in the face of 
declining revenues.  Planned investment for future years should be brought forward as a 
countercyclical measure, and also to make effective use of unemployed labour during the 
crisis.  New employment generating public works can be sometimes more effective in 
poverty reduction than social welfare programmes in the LDC context.  
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 In LDCs with adequate foreign exchange reserves and low inflation, monetary policy 
should be used to stimulate private investment.  All LDCs, however, should be able to 
provide subsidized long term credit to stimulate private investment in productive 
activities, and particularly in employment generating small and medium sized 
enterprises. 
 The LDC financial systems were less severely affected by the global credit crunch in the 
early phase of the financial crisis in 2008 than other developing countries. It is 
nevertheless important that the LDC central banks closely monitor their domestic 
banking sector as the weaknesses of the real economy can lead to loan defaults and 
increased fragility of the banking system at later stages.  Strict capital controls in external 
accounts is also essential for monetary and financial stability. 
 Because of the extremely limited policy space in most LDCs, it is essential that each 
LDC produces its own detailed appraisal of the impact of the crisis, its financing needs 
under different contingencies, and specific policies to deal with the impact within the 
macroeconomic framework of its PRSP.  This should form the basis for cooperation with 
the international development community and a bottom up approach to the appraisal of 
the financing needs of the LDCs in the wake of the global crisis. 
 
At the international level:  
 With the decline in government revenues as a result of the economic crisis, the LDC 
governments need considerable increases in financial support from the donors.  The recent 
increases in international credit facilities announced by G-20 London summit in April 
2009 are welcome, though they do not adequately address the LDC requirements.    
 The reaffirmation of commitments to achieve their ODA pledges and Gleneagles 
commitments on aid and debt relief by G-20 in the London summit needs to be followed-
up rigorously by the donor community.  This will in itself be sufficient to cater for the 
extra resource requirements by the LDCs to cope with the current crisis and move towards 
achieving the Millennium Development Goals. 
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 Under the current ODA architecture, multilateral aid channels through the international 
financial institutions and regional development banks appear to be best equipped for fast 
and flexible action required for crisis response.  A proper balance needs to be struck 
between budgetary support, private sector credit, and other types of assistance without a 
priori ad hoc ceilings imposed.   
 Coordination, transparency, flexibility, and democratic governance are elements of the 
global aid architecture which need to be strengthened, along with the reform of the 
international financial architecture currently under way.  This can be only achieved 
effectively with collective voice of the recipient countries represented. 
 Advanced countries should move quickly to implement their pledges on duty free and 
quota free market access for LDC export, and remove export subsidies and producers’ 
subsidies on primary products that compete with LDC exports.  The pressures from 
domestic producers for protection through the introduction of new product standards, 
labelling requirements etc. during the crisis should be warded off. 
 Genuine LDC ownership of policies in dealing with the economic crisis is as important as 
it is for the long term developmental impact of aid. Adequate technical assistance should 
be provided to LDCs to be able to assess the impact of the crisis and their financing needs, 
and participate in policy design to deal with the crisis.     
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